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APPELLATE SUPERVISION OF REMEDIES
IN PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
ROBERT L. HINKLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The business of the federal courts is changing. Resolving private
disputes is no longer their only or perhaps even their primary
function. Instead, federal courts are increasingly in the business of
making decisions with widespread public ramifications.' The courts
restructure public institutions such as school systems, 2 prisons,3 and
mental hospitals;4 they reorganize segments of the business community
by dismantling corporate mergers 5 and revising employee seniority
systems;" and they shape the political structure by reapportioning state
legislatures7 and overseeing voter registration."
To some extent the federal courts in these public law cases 9 are
doing nothing essentially different from what they have always done,
i.e., adjudicating rights and duties. Thus part of any school desegrega-
tion case is determining whether constitutional rights have been
violated, and part of any reapportionment case is determining whether
the existing legislature is unconstitutionally constituted. The liability
phase of the public law case may be more complex and will involve
0 Member, Florida Bar, Law clerk for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. B.A., Florida State University, 1972; J.D., Harvard University, 1976.
1. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129,
142-43 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); United States
v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969).
7. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964).
9. No bright line separates public from private law cases. Rather, "public law"
is used as a rough expression for adjudication which impacts upon the public, i.e.,
which significantly affects persons other than a few participants in some dispute.
Theoretically, of course, every case could affect the public by bringing about incremental
changes in the law. Public law cases, however, ordinarily have immediate and widespread
effects irrespective of the operation of stare decisis.
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decisions of greater consequence than the liability phase of a private
lawsuit, but the essence of the proceedings will be the same.'0
At the stage of the litigation where the court grants relief, however,
the situation is different. Providing relief in many public law cases
raises problems of a completely different order from providing relief
in a traditional private lawsuit. In a traditional private lawsuit the
remedy is closely linked to the right; once liability is established the
remedy is almost precisely determined." In a public law case, on the
other hand, a determination of liability often does nothing to narrow
the choice among numerous remedial alternatives. 12 In addition, public
law remedies are likely to be both enormously complex and of
tremendous public importance. Their impact is not limited to the
parties to the lawsuit but extends to large segments of the public and
may affect virtually everyone in the country.
Relatively little attention has been given to the possibility that
these differences in the nature of public law remedies call for
differences in the way the judicial system goes about choosing them.
One aspect of the problem which has almost completely escaped
attention is the kind of relationship which should exist between
federal district and appellate courts with regard to formulating
remedies.
Despite the obliviousness to the issue evinced in numerous
appellate opinions," the proper appellate role in overseeing public
law remedies is an issue of considerable significance. First, the
importance of the remedial choice makes it essential that the decision-
making process be as reliable as possible, and the relationship between
10. The differences in the substantive law involved in public and private lawsuits
will of course affect the character of decisionmaking. Differing considerations will
be taken into account in adjudicating liability. In addition, the different goals of
public law adjudication may affect such procedural doctrines as standing and the
availability of class actions. See generally Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 937, 940-49 (1975); Chayes, supra note 1. Nevertheless, the essential
inquiry remains the same at the liability phase of public and private law cases: has
the governing legal standard been violated?
11. See Chayes, supra note 1.
12. For example, in a school desegregation case a court must inevitably choose
among an almost limitless variety of possible remedies. The necessity for choice
could be eliminated by adopting a remedy such as an award of liquidated damages to
any student subjected to discrimination. However, any such result would clearly be
unacceptable, and fashioning an acceptable remedy for a particular fact situation
unavoidably requires choosing among myriad alternatives. See Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
13. Compare, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945)
(broad appellate review undertaken without explanation) with Ethyl Gasoline Corp.
v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) (narrow appellate review undertaken without
explanation).
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district and appellate courts may greatly affect the reliability of that
process. Second, justifying the federal judicial role is nowhere more
difficult than with regard to public law remedies, 14 and the relation-
ship between district and appellate courts may greatly affect both
the perception and the fact of judicial integrity.
This article analyzes the relationship between federal district and
appellate courts in formulating public law remedies.
II. Tm APPELLATE ROLE IN
TRADITIONAL PRIVATE ADJUDICATION
Because courts have frequently ignored the issue of the appropri-
ate appellate role in formulating public law remedies,'5 they have
often uncritically applied the standards of review developed for dealing
with remedies in traditional private lawsuits. It is therefore useful to
begin an analysis of the appellate role respecting public law remedies
with a brief overview of the analogous appellate role in traditional
private adjudication.
As previously indicated, private law remedies are closely linked
to the underlying rights. A well-established structure has evolved which
provides a right-remedy interlock. This structure establishes that the
remedy for a tort is an award of damages, and it delineates the ele-
ments properly includible in the damages. Similarly, the structure
determines whether the remedy for a breach of contract is a damages
award or a decree of specific performance. These standards are not
completely self-executing; there are still cases as to which the remedial
choice is not precisely determined. Nevertheless, for the most part
the right-remedy interlock clearly dictates the remedial decision.
A meaningful appellate role in choosing private law remedies is
assured because appellate courts formulate the right-remedy interlock
structure. It is taken for granted that announcement of the rules
governing when damages will or will not be awarded, or when injunc-
tive relief is or is not available, is an appellate function. Nobody
would have maintained, for example, that in deciding the question
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents' 6-whether a damage action
would lie directly under the fourth amendment-the Supreme Court
should have deferred to the district court's disposition of the issue
to any extent at all. The availability of damages was obviously a
14. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1313.
15. See note 13 supra.
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
1976]
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"question of law"'17 as to which de novo appellate consideration was
in order.'
Although the structure of right-remedy interlocks dictates the
remedial choice in the vast majority of traditional private lawsuits,
it does not always determine the remedial choice completely. For
example, the structure may establish in a given situation that an
injunction would be proper without mandating that the injunction
in fact be issued.19 More importantly, when the structure approves
the issuance of an injunction it generally does not dictate the precise
terms of the injunction. 20 Hence the right-remedy interlock structure
may dictate that the remedy for a defendant's breach of a contract
containing a noncompetition clause is an injunction against conducting
business in the relevant area, but the structure does not precisely
specify such terms of the decree as how the defendant's business will
be defined or what the relevant area will be. Thus in many circum-
stances, decisions with respect to injunctions are discretionary, i.e.,
an ad hoc choice is required. There is nothing in the nature of things
which indicates that these discretionary decisions should be made solely
by district courts, but it is to them that the private law system allocates
the decisions. District court resolutions of these issues are said to be
reversible only for "abuse of discretion," a standard usually associated
with almost certain affirmance.
Despite these pockets of district court discretion, appellate control
of private law remedies is extensive. First, most private law cases in-
volve damages or specific relief. A district court ordinarily has no
discretion to withhold these remedies, nor does it have discretion in
formulating their terms. Second, even in cases where there is discre-
tion, its scope is narrow and its significance is limited. The district
court may have discretion in choosing the terms of a decree, but the
right-remedy interlock will make the purpose of the decree clear. For
example, the right-remedy interlock may dictate that the purpose of
the decree against our defendant contract-breaker is to prevent future
competition with the plaintiff. The scope of discretion in choosing
17. Traditionally, "questions of law" are subject to de novo appellate consideration
whereas "questions of fact" are not. The phrases themselves provide only very imprecise
guidance; indeed, they are perhaps better seen as conclusory labels than as analytical
tools. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 545-49 (3d ed. 1972). Neverthe-
less, the gloss which the phrases have accumulated makes them useful guides.
18. See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). Cf. Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (availability of injunctive relief).
19. Cf. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON REMEDIES 52-54 (1973).
20. Cf. id. at 54-55.
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the terms of decrees to accomplish that purpose is narrow. Further-
more, a discretionary decree containing one set of terms is likely to be
little more efficacious or less obtrusive than another decree containing
a wholly different set of terms. Thus the district court's discretion is
channeled and its choice will have limited significance.
2 1
The pockets of district court discretion which exist in the private
law remedial system do not destroy appellate control because they are
relatively insignificant. But when those same pockets of district court
discretion are uncritically carried over into a public law system, the
situation is different. The scope of district court discretion is magnified
because there are virtually limitless ways to frame broad and complex
public law remedies; the significance is magnified because the remedial
alternatives may vary greatly in effectiveness and obtrusiveness. Accord-
ingly, appellate remedial control is greatly reduced.
Nevertheless, federal courts have often uncritically applied the
private law approach in public law cases. 22 The result has been to
insulate from effective appellate supervision remedial decisions of
enormous importance. But the pressure on appellate courts to oversee
remedial decisions of such consequence-decisions with which they
almost always come in contact because of the frequency with which
public law remedies; the significance is magnified because the remedial
for expanding the appellate role.
III. APPELLATE APPROACHES IN
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
A. Rules Specifying the Remedy
Which Must Be Chosen
One way federal appellate courts have sought to control public
law remedies is by announcing rules specifying the type of remedy
which a district court must choose in vindicating a particular right.
Such rules establish right-remedy interlocks. Just as announcement
of the rules which establish the right-remedy interlocks in traditional
private adjudication is an appellate function, 3 announcing analogous
21. The same is true of district court decisions to withhold injunctive relief
altogether. The scope of district court discretion is narrow because appellate courts
announce guidelines governing the decision. The significance of the remaining district
court discretion is limited because in circumstances where the guidelines do not
clearly dictate the decision, it is not likely to make much difference whether the
injunction issues or not.
22. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) [Lemon II]; International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
23. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
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rules in public law cases is assumed to be an appellate function."
And just as the approach provides a meaningful appellate role in
choosing private law remedies, the same is true with respect to public
law remedies.
The approach is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's handling of cases
involving racially discriminatory voter registration. Faced with a series
of such cases during the mid-1960s, that court announced the rule that
a "freezing" remedy was required. 25 Freezing required black applicants
to be evaluated on the basis of the minimum standards which were
in fact applied to earlier white applicants, regardless of higher statutory
standards which would concededly be valid if applied uniformly.2
Freezing, of course, was not the only remedy which could have been
chosen for voter discrimination. The registrar could have been ordered
to register particular applicants or not to discriminate among appli-
cants on the basis of race; additionally, certain tests or practices could
have been enjoined. While these remedies may have been deemed
inadequate, surely other alternatives would have been at least as
effective as freezing. For example, a receiver could have been appointed
with instructions to register every applicant meeting the minimum
age requirement. But despite the host of alternatives, the court of
appeals chose freezing.
The Fifth Circuit's voter discrimination approach effectively con-
strained district court decisionmaking. The court not only announced
that the appropriate remedy was freezing, but it went so far as to
set forth the required decrees verbatim so that there could be no
doubt what was envisioned.27 Moreover, the court's rule did not un-
24. See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964).
25. United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Ward,
345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964). Cf.
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
26. The decrees also gave the defendants the option of requiring the re-registration
of all voters according to the higher standards, but that option was obviously unlikely
to be taken. See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 770 (5th Cir. 1964).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 345 F.2d 857, 861-64 (5th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, 805-07 (5th Cir. 1965). The court may first have been
prompted to set forth the decrees verbatim because of fear of district court resistance
to the appellate mandates. In United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964),
the district court had refused to find a constitutional violation despite clear evidence
of egregious racial discrimination. In reversing, the court of appeals did not set forth
the decree but elaborated detailed guidelines. Id. at 771. Later in United States v.
Ward, 345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1965), the district court had refused to rule on whether
a pattern of racial discrimination existed. The court of appeals held the refusal to
be erroneous and determined that a pattern of discrimination did exist. The court
'noted that there had been a long delay since suit was filed despite the ease with
which the small number of blacks in the relevant county could be accommodated, and
it proceeded to set forth the decree verbatim. Id. at 861-64.
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desirably sacrifice flexibility. The factual situations involved were
sufficiently similar that the choice of a remedy could sensibly be made
once and for all.2 8 In sum, it was an approach that worked well.
Such an approach will not work well in many other areas, however.
Most of the difficult remedial problems involve factual situations which
vary greatly from case to case. A single rule was formulated to deal
with the not-too-different voter discrimination cases; such a rule cannot
be formulated to deal sensibly with the widely varying factors affecting
choices among remedies for unconstitutional prison conditions, segre-
gated school systems, uncompetitive markets, racially discriminatory
seniority systems, or a host of other problems calling for fine choices
among complex remedies. Affirmative rules prescribing remedial
choices are desirable only where the factual settings are sufficiently
similar both to make the same remedy effective in each case and to
make no other remedy more effective in particular cases. By and large,
if appellate courts are to supervise remedies meaningfully, they will
have to do so by some method other than the announcement of rules
establishing right-remedy interlocks.
B. Rules Designating Which Remedies
May or May Not Be Chosen
Federal appellate courts have sometimes prescribed rules specifying
the types of remedies available for vindicating particular rights.
Rather than deciding which remedy must be chosen, such rules limit
the appellate role to announcing various alternatives from which the
district court may choose. It is taken for granted that this is properly
an appellate function.29
An example of the approach is Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen burg
Board of Education.° When the local school board challenged the
use of remedial devices such as altering school attendance zones and
However, even if the appellate court's practice of authoring the decrees was first
undertaken because of the fear of district court resistance, the practice did not remain
so limited. In another case, United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965), the
court expressly disclaimed any apprehension about the district judge, noting that
his limited remedy had been adopted in reliance on previously-controlling Fifth Circuit
precedents. Id. at 805. Nevertheless, the court of appeals said that "good administration"
necessitated specifying the appropriate decree in order to achieve uniformity within the
circuit. Id.
28. If there had arisen significantly dissimilar factual situations calling for varia-
tions in the remedy, the Fifth Circuit's approach presumably would have allowed
consideration of them. However, the basic remedial approach-freezing-was firmly
established.
29. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
30. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
19761
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busing students, the Supreme Court decided on its own that such
devices were within the broad and flexible equitable remedial powers
of the federal courts.31 The Court counseled deference to the determi-
nations of the district courts in regard to the appropriateness of using
particular remedies in individual cases; 2 it did not defer to the
district courts regarding the power to utilize such remedies in general.
Other examples abound of appellate consideration of whether
certain types of remedial approaches may be used. It has frequently
been held that antitrust decrees can exceed the scope of the
defendant's conduct comprising the violation.3 Courts can order the
levying of taxes necessary to operate a constitutional school system."
They can award retroactive seniority status to remedy discriminatory
hiring refusals.35 Injunctions may be issued against state prison com-
missioners in order to remedy the unconstitutionality of county jail
conditions.38 Courts can require divestiture of a merged company to
remedy violations of a rule formulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.3 7 The list is almost endless. And always the availability
of the particular type of remedy is treated as a question for de novo
appellate determination.
Such appellate decisions provide little check on district court dis-
cretion. Deciding that a remedial approach is available does not
indicate when the approach should be utilized or how to choose
among available alternatives.
Appellate courts, however, often do restrict choices by announcing
rules which eliminate certain remedies from consideration. School
desegregation and legislative reapportionment are two areas presenting
a virtually infinite number of remedial options. Limitless ways exist
of drawing school attendance zones or voting districts in order to
remedy constitutional violations.
In each of these areas, the United States Supreme Court has acted
to foreclose some alternatives. For example, in school desegregation,
Milliken v. Bradley8 ruled out interdistrict pupil assignment as a
31. Id. at 15-16.
32. Id. at 31.
33. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88-89 (1950)
(citing cases).
34. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
35. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
36. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (lst Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
37. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 464 (1969).
38. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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remedy39 for interdistrict constitutional violations.4° As to reapportion-
ment, Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens41 ruled out
significant court-ordered changes in the number of districts or legis-
lators.4 2 Milliken and Beens each eliminated one category of remedial
alternatives.
Both Milliken and Beens confined remedial choices to some
extent.4 3 The results in both cases are perhaps understandable: the
breadth of school and apportionment remedies had increased
dramatically, and there may have been a need to curb headstrong
district judges. The district courts' remedial approaches may have
39. There is language in the plurality opinion in Milliken indicating that the
Court may have thought it was dealing with the scope of constitutional rights rather
than only with the issue of available remedies. Id. at 747. But clearly the constitutional
right at issue was the right to be treated nondiscriminatorily by the state's public school
system. To say that a student has no "right" to attend a school in a different district
does not explain the Court's result; a student ordinarily has no "right" to attend
any particular school within his own district, yet the Court has approved orders
assigning students to particular schools. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Milliken Justice Stewart, whose fifth vote was crucial,
joined the Court's opinion only after emphasizing in concurrence that it dealt not
with substantive constitutional law but only with the appropriate exercise of federal
equity jurisdiction. 418 U.S. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus Milliken deals with
remedies, not constitutional rights.
40. The Court's rule does not foreclose crossing district lines where a constitutional
violation in one district produces a significant segregative effect in another. Id. at 744-45.
41. 406 U.S. 187 (1972) (per curiam).
42. The district court's order changed the number of legislative districts from 67
to 35, reduced the number of senators by almost 50%, and reduced the number of
representatives by almost 25%. Id. at 188. The Supreme Court summarily reversed. The
Court said that the numbers of districts or legislators could not be significantly
changed unless they occasioned "significant and invalidating population deviations,"
thus presumably leaving open the possibility that in some circumstances a similar
remedy might be approved. Id. at 200. However, the possibility seems remote at
best. First, it is unclear how the number of legislators or districts could ever itself
occasion "significant and invalidating population deviations." Second, in Beens the
Court acted summarily, without the data on which the district court's decree was
based. It was apparently deemed unnecessary to determine the effects of Minnesota's
number of legislators and districts. Beens thus seems to establish a firm rule against
such major size changes.
43. Like Milliken, Beens exhibited some confusion as to whether the issue was
one of appropriate remedies or substantive constitutional rights. "We know of no
federal constitutional principle or requirement" authorizing the district court's action.
406 U.S. at 198. "[Ihe number of a State's legislative districts or the number of
members in each house of its legislature raises no issue of equal protection .... "Id.
at 199. Certainly, however, apportionment remedies can properly go beyond mini-
mum constitutional requirements. Compare Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971)
(when district courts fashion apportionment remedies, single-member districts should
normally be used) with Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (single-member
districts are not constitutionally required absent special showing). As Justice Stewart
correctly noted, the issue in Beens was remedial discretion rather than substantive
constitutional rights. 406 U.S. at 201 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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been misguided, and the Supreme Court's reversals may have led to
better results.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's approach in Milliken and Beens
provides an irrational and ineffective check on district courts. It is
irrational because the Court, in its effort to eliminate the most
obtrusive remedies, may have eliminated the remedies which would
be least obtrusive in some circumstances. In addition, even if the
disapproved remedies would always be more obtrusive, they might
in some circumstances be so much more effective in vindicating the
constitutional rights at issue that the obtrusiveness would be tolerable.
As Justice White noted in his dissent in Milliken, the effect of the
majority's holding was that "no matter how much less burdensome or
more effective and efficient in many respects . . . the metropolitan
plan might be, the school district line may not be crossed.""4
In Beens the Court acted summarily, without all the relevant
statistics and maps, without the masters' reports on which the district
court relied, and without briefs or oral arguments on the merits.
45
With so little information the majority was not in a position to
evaluate the burdensomeness or effectiveness of the district court's
remedy in the case at hand. It clearly could not evaluate the
appropriateness of these factors in every conceivable set of circum-
stances, yet its rule foreclosed a category of remedial choices from
consideration in all future reapportionment cases. The undesirability
of the inflexible Milliken and Beens result is apparent.
The Supreme Court's approach is an ineffective check on district
courts because they are left countless remedies among which to choose.
The district court in Milliken remained free to select from numerous
approaches, and by disapproving interdistrict relief the Supreme Court
did nothing to supervise that choice. Similarly, the Supreme Court's
handling of Beens did nothing to restrict the district court's choice
among the numerous remaining ways to correct Minnesota's unconsti-
tutional apportionment. In short, the Milliken and Beens approach
may produce undesirable remedial choices in at least some cases
without significantly confining district court discretion.4 6
44. 418 U.S. at 768 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 203 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. Of course some rules foreclosing categories of remedies would never lead to
undesirable results. Such rules foreclose the use of a remedy the implementation of
which would always constitute an abuse of discretion. Using the remedy could be
characterized as per se abuse of discretion. The Court may have thought Milliken and
Beens were such cases. However, it is clear that circumstances could exist in which
use of the types of remedies employed by the district courts in Milliken and Beens
would be quite reasonable and hence would not constitute an abuse of discretion. The
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C. Remedial Guideposts
Federal appellate courts have sometimes limited themselves to
announcing broad principles intended to guide rather than dictate
district court remedial decisions. Such appellate pronouncements are
completely consistent with the traditional abuse-of-discretion review
standard; in support of decisions that district courts have or have not
abused their discretion, appellate courts quite naturally announce
the general principles which guide that determination. Thus no ex-
planation of this appellate function has been offered.
4 7
The use of such remedial guideposts avoids the inflexibility of
rules by allowing the relevant circumstances of each case to be con-
sidered in formulating the remedy. However, district rather than
appellate courts consider the circumstances and formulate appropriate
remedies. Consequently, to the same extent that inflexibility is avoided
appellate control is lost.
The approach is illustrated by United States v. W.T. Grant Co.48
It will be recalled that the private law system often gives district
courts discretion to issue or withhold injunctive relief.49 W.T. Grant
involved the issue of whether to allow that same discretion in a public
law context. The defendant's conceded antitrust violation had been
voluntarily discontinued pending trial, and the district court refused
to issue an injunction. 50 The Supreme Court affirmed, saying that a
strong showing of abuse would be required in order to reverse the
district court's decision. 51 The Supreme Court did, however, announce
principles to guide district courts in deciding such cases. It said that
defendants bore a heavy burden of showing that there was no reason-
able expectation that the wrong would be repeated.5 2 It further
articulated the standard as a "cognizable danger of recurrent violation,
something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the
case alive."53 Whether such statements provide any significant guidance
remedies would fall only because of the Milliken and Beens rules. At any rate, even
rules of per se abuse leave numerous alternatives from which district courts can choose.
47. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [Brown II].
48. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
49. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
50. The district court actually dismissed the case as "moot," a concededly erroneous
view. 345 U.S. at 630. Whatever the terminology employed, however, the effect of
the ditrict court's disposition was to refuse to enjoin illegal conduct which had been
voluntarily discontinued.
51. 345 U.S. at 633. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that since the district court
had dismissed the case on the erroneous ground of "mootness," its discretion had not
been exercised at all and was accordingly due no deference. Id. at 638 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The dissent went unanswered.
52. Id. at 633.
53. Id.
1976]
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at all is open to question. Nevertheless, the amount of guidance is
not very great and, as a result, the efficacy of appellate supervision is
questionable. 5
4
Guideposts are perhaps even less effective when the issue is not
whether to grant equitable relief but what the terms of the relief
should be. The school desegregation cases are illustrative. In Brown
v. Board of Education [Brown 1], 55 the Supreme Court held segregated
school systems unconstitutional. Rather than immediately remanding
the several cases involved in order to let the district courts initially
formulate remedies, an approach often taken when case dismissals
are reversed on appeal, the Court scheduled another round of argu-
ments. 56 In Brown v. Board of Education [Brown II],57 it announced
principles intended to guide the district courts. The Court noted the
public and private interests at stake and directed the district courts
to take those interests into account in requiring a prompt and reason-
able start toward full compliance with the constitutional principles
enunciated in Brown 1.5 The Court recognized that additional time
might be found necessary once a reasonable start was made, and it
placed the burden on the defendants to show "good faith compliance
at the earliest practicable date." 59 The Court also noted the types
of administrative problems which could properly be considered.6 0
Finally, it rendered its now infamous statement that what was required
was "all deliberate speed."'
61
Whatever the merits of Brown II's remedial standards as a sub-
stantive matter, it is clear that wide latitude remained. Indeed, the
Supreme Court expressly recognized that the district courts were left
a liberal measure of flexibility.62 As previously indicated, such
flexibility is accompanied by a loss of appellate control when, as
seems to have been the case, appellate courts confine themselves to
announcing guidelines.63 Nothing in Brown II suggested the Court
would go further in guiding the district courts, and the traditional
54. The amount of guidance would be greater if appellate courts illustrated the
application of the principles on a case-by-case basis. However, the abuse-of-discretion
review standard prevents any such illustration.
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Id. at 495.
57. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
58. Id. at 300.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 300-01.
61. Id. at 301. In one of the cases, Gebhart v. Belton, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the
Court upheld the order of the Supreme Court of Delaware that the plaintiffs be
immediately admitted to a previously all-white school. Id. at 301.
62. 349 U.S. at 300.
63. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
abuse-of-discretion review standard would leave those courts free to
choose among the myriad remedial approaches consistent with Brown
II's broad outline.
The freedom left district courts by the Brown II approach is best
illustrated by another landmark school desegregation case, Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklen burg Board of Education.64 Unlike the situation in
Brown II, where the district courts had dismissed the claims and
therefore had not reached the question of remedies, the district
court in Swann had entered an expansive and complex decree. Thus,
where it would have been possible for the Court in Brown II to super-
vise the remedies more extensively after their formulation by the
district courts,65 it was clear in Swann that whatever control the
Supreme Court was going to exercise would have to be exercised at
that time.6 Nevertheless, the Court confined itself to announcing
principles differing in substance but not in appellate technique from
those announced in Brown II. Swann undoubtedly helped channel
district court discretion, but wide leeway remained.6 7
The "guideposts" approach, then, provides only a marginal appellate
role in formulating remedies. However, the approach does manage
to avoid intolerable inflexibility. As the Swann Court expressly noted,
the variations from one school case to the next make it impossible to
lay down rigid rules governing all situations. 6s If prescribing rules or
establishing guideposts were the only alternatives available to federal
appellate courts, then in the many areas where rules cannot sensibly
be utilized those courts would have to settle for the very limited
input which guideposts provide.
But rules and guideposts are not the only alternatives. Though
they were the only techniques utilized for controlling remedies in
traditional private adjudication, there is no reason why federal
appellate courts cannot review public law remedies more extensively.
64. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
65. For example, the Supreme Court could have extensively controlled the Brown
remedies by carefully scrutinizing the eventual decrees without deferring to the district
court's discretion. See generally notes 121-57 and accompanying text infra.
66. It was of course possible that the Swann remedy would resurface in the Supreme
Court following modification or implementation, but the basic structure of the decree
was finally approved in the Court's 1971 opinion. That basic structure had been chosen
by the district court; appellate control was minimal.
67. The same is true of other cases announcing general remedial principles. See,
e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944) (antitrust
decree should include those features which reasonably tend "to dissipate the restraints
and prevent evasions"); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (school
desegregation plan may not fail "to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and
effective disestablishment of a dual system").
68. 402 U.S. at 29.
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Indeed, they have often done so. I turn now to analysis of some of the
techniques which have been used.
D. Scrutinizing the District Court's
Decisionmaking Process
One way federal appellate courts have sought to narrow the
discretionary range which survives the announcement of rules and
guideposts is through careful scrutiny of the district court's decision-
making process. As the courts have sometimes recognized, it makes
no sense to defer to a district court's discretion where it has not in
fact been exercised.69 The next logical step is to withhold deference
unless it is determined that the district court correctly understood
the guiding principles and gave appropriate consideration to the
available alternatives.
That approach was taken in Davis v. Board of School Commis-
sioners,7 0 a school desegregation case. The lower court's student
assignment plan was challenged.7 ' The Supreme Court noted that
the lower court had unjustifiably felt constrained to treat one section
of the city separately from the rest of the school system. The possible
use of busing and split zoning had not been adequately considered.
7 2
Given those flaws in the decisionmaking process, the Supreme Court
did not invoke the abuse-of-discretion review standard but rather
reversed. On remand the appropriate alternatives were to be given
due consideration.7
The Supreme Court noted in Davis that the record made it clear
that inadequate consideration had been given the several alternatives.74
The implication may be that the Court would have been less willing
to reverse and remand if the record had been less clear as to what
69. See, e.g., Pullum v. Greene, 396 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1968) (no deference
due district court's denial of injunction where it erroneously held for defendant on
merits); United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 638 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
71. The challenged plan had been formulated by the court of appeals, not the
district court. The court of appeals had not deferentially reviewed the original district
court order, but had applied a heightened review standard under which an appellate
court makes a de novo determination of the adequacy of a remedy to vindicate a
plaintiff's underlying rights. See generally notes 97-120 and accompanying text infra.
That the Supreme Court was reviewing the remedial choice of a court of appeals
does not affect the analysis, however; the same approach could be taken in reviewing
district court decisions.
72. 402 U.S. at 38.
73. Id. See also Medley v. School Bd., 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1172 (1974) (reversing district court school desegregation decree where inadequate
consideration was given to split zoning and busing).
74. 402 U.S. at 38.
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had and had not been considered. Any such result would be un-
desirable. A district court should not be able to evade appellate
review by obscuring the grounds of its decision.
In analogous cases reviewing administrative decisions, the Court
has not let the ambiguity of the record defeat review.7 5 Instead, it
has insisted that the basis of the administrative decision be made
clear. For example, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 7  the Board had
ordered the reinstatement of several workers who had been dis-
criminatorily fired. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's power
to issue such an order but remanded the case to the Board for "a
clear indication that it has exercised [its] discretion. '' 7 The Court
said that the "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity
in its exercise. ' ' 7 There is no apparent reason why the same is not
true of the judicial process.7 9 Just as the Court required the NLRB
to give the basis of its order, federal appellate courts could require
district courts to state the bases of their orders.8 0
Such an approach should be adopted.8x District court discretion
75. See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974).
76. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
77. Id. at 197.
78. Id.
79. Indeed, in an important respect public law cases are more like administrative
proceedings than like traditional private lawsuits. In a traditional private lawsuit, the
only significantly affected interests are those of the parties before the court. The
parties' self-interest provides some assurance that the relevant considerations will be
brought to the court's attention. In public law cases and administrative proceedings,
on the other hand, the results affect many people other than the parties. Significantly
affected interests should be represented whenever possible. Inevitably, however,
representation will often be less than perfect. The processes provide no inherent
assurance that the decisionmaker will take all the appropriate considerations into
account. Hence it makes sense to require courts, like agencies, to explain their
decisions in public law cases.
80. The technique of requiring decisions to be explained can be criticized as
providing a limited check on the agencies. However, the technique should prove more
fruitful when applied to district courts. First, appellate courts exercise greater control
over the substantive remedial principles applied by district courts than over those
applied by agencies, a difference which becomes much greater as appellate courts adopt
the various approaches for substantively controlling remedies discussed below. See notes
83-157 and accompanying text infra. Second, in some instances district courts may be
less likely than agencies to have a definite remedial orientation, thus making it less
probable that on remand a district court will merely uncritically reenter its original
order.
81. Several opinions adumbrate such an approach. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971), the Supreme Court vacated the district court's reapportionment decree,
noting that the district court had "entered judgment without expressly putting aside
on supportable grounds" several alternatives. Id. at 160. However, it was clear that
the Court disapproved the district court's remedy as a substantive matter; the quoted
language suggesting a requirement of expressed reasoning may have been inadvertent.
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need not be undercut to any extent; if on remand the district court
remains convinced that its earlier result is the most desirable one,
it can reenter the same decree. The district court would be compelled
to reconcile its result with the governing principles, but no one would
contend that a decision which could not be so reconciled should be
upheld. The only other requirement would be an indication that
the district court had indeed exercised its discretion and consciously
rejected the other available alternatives. There is no reason to defer
to a district court decision which cannot meet these standards.
In addition to its effect on the allocation of roles between district
and appellate courts, the requirement that district courts explain
their decisions serves another function. The process of formulating
opinions may affect the results reached by the district court.8 2 Thus
even if there were no appellate review at all, district courts might
reach different remedial results if reasoned opinions were required.
The praise accorded the practice of rendering opinions in other
areas is equally deserved in the remedial field. An approach to appellate
remedial control which requires district courts to issue opinions will
have significant beneficial side effects.
In summary, requiring district courts to explain their remedial
choices will: (1) eliminate unjustifiable deference to discretion which
has not in fact been exercised; (2) increase appellate control slightly
by reducing district court evasion of guiding principles; (3) enhance
the reliability of the district courts' exercise of discretion by ensuring
a full and well-considered treatment of the issues; and (4) otherwise
leave the the district courts' discretion intact. The first three of
these effects are clearly desirable, and the approach should be em-
braced whether or not appellate courts decide to disturb the present
scope of discretion allowed the district courts. I turn now to several
approaches which do not leave the district court's discretion intact.
E. Presumptively Preferred Remedies
An approach which makes some substantive abridgment of the
district court's discretion involves the delineation of presumptively
preferred remedial choices. The approach falls somewhere between
the establishment of rules requiring particular remedies for given
See also Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) (antitrust
decree vacated and case remanded to district court for findings of fact necessary to
framing appropriate decree).
82. "Any judge can testify to the experience of working on opinions that won't
write with the result that his conclusions are changed because of his inability to
state to his satisfaction the reasons upon which they depend." J. LANDis, THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS 106 (Greenwood Press ed. 1974).
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rights83 and the announcement of broad guiding principles.8 4 Unlike
the approach requiring the use of particular remedies, the pre-
sumptively preferred remedy need not be utilized; where the situa-
tion calls for a different remedy the presumption is overcome and
the district court is free to adopt the other remedy. But unlike
the guiding principles approach, district courts are not merely told
what factors to consider and what goals their remedies should seek
to accomplish, but rather are told what remedy should be chosen
absent unusual circumstances justifying the use of a different remedy.
The presumptively preferred remedy can be illustrated by
the handling of one aspect of the legislative reapportionment cases.
In framing reapportionment decrees, district courts must decide where
to draw district lines and whether to utilize single-member or multi-
member districts. The latter decision is now governed by a presump-
tive preference for single-member districts8 5
The presumption was first announced in 1971 in Connor v. John-
son,"6 where the Supreme Court hastily granted a stay of a district
court plan which prescribed multimember districts. The Court said
that "when district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans,
single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts
as a general matter."8 7 The Court did not say single-member districts
were always required, but limited itself to holding them generally
preferable .8
The presumptive rather than binding nature of the preference
for single-member districts was underscored in 1973 in Mahan. v.
Howell. 9 The Supreme Court upheld the use of a multimember
district where the time pressure caused by an impending election had
forced the district court to act before acquiring sufficient information
for the formulation of a plan using only single-member districts.
The Court said multimember districts were not always insupportable
83. See generally notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
84. See generally notes 47-68 and accompanying text supra.
85. The presumption applies to plans formulated by district courts, not to those
formulated by the states themselves. Where states opt for multimember districts they
need not be set aside absent special findings. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971).
86. 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
87. Id. at 692.
88. Any ambiguity on this score was subsequently cleared up. On remand the
district court did not read the Court's ruling as a flat requirement that single-member
districts be used; instead it referred the proceedings to a master for a determination
of whether using single-member districts was feasible. On a subsequent appeal the
Supreme Court expressly approved that approach. Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549,
551 (1972).
89. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
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and that given these "unique factors"-the time pressure and lack
of information-the district court's order should be upheld. 90
The presumptive preference approach provides meaningful
guidance to district courts. They know that in most cases the pre-
ferred remedy should be utilized, and despite uncertainty as to just
what circumstances justify abandoning the presumption, there are
surely many instances where the issue is not in doubt. To the extent
that district court choices are guided, appellate control is achieved.
The effectiveness of the appellate role is largely determined by
the standard of review applied to the district court's decision in any
particular case as to whether the presumption is overcome. If the
district court's decision is reviewed only under the deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard, as the Court intimated in Mahan,9 ' then the
appellate role will not be very effective. But a much more stringent
review standard was staked out in Chapman v. Meier.9 2 The Court
there reversed a district court reapportionment plan using multi-
member districts and called for the expeditious reinstatement of
single-member districts unless the district court could articulate such
unique factors as would justify multimember districts3 At the very
least the Court meant to require the articulation of reasons for depart-
ing from the presumption; the further clear implication was that the
Court would carefully scrutinize the articulated reasons. 4 The use
of a heightened review standard for the decision not to apply the
presumption s greatly enhanced the appellate control achieved by the
presumptive preference approach.
90. Id. at 333.
91. Id. at 332-33 (district court's use of multimember district was "within the
bounds of the discretion confided to it").
92. 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
93. Id. at 21.
94. The implication was underscored in East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall,
424 U.S. 636 (1976). The district court entered a reapportionment plan using a multi-
member district. The court of appeals reversed on constitutional grounds. Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). The Supreme Court refused to
reach the constitutional issues raised by the court of appeals. Instead, it invoked the
presumptive preference for single-member districts. Rather than remanding for district
court consideration of whether the presumption was overcome, the Supreme Court
determined that it was not.
95. The Court's willingness carefully to scrutinize the proffered reasons for depart-
ing from a presumptively preferred remedy was further exhibited in Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). There the Court held that applicants for employ-
ment who were denied positions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970), were entitled to an award of the seniority
they presumptively would have earned but for the wrongful treatment, "in the absence
of justification for denying that relief." 424 U.S. at 767. The Court then scrutinized
and rejected the district court's announced reasons for refusing the seniority relief.
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Even with such heightened, particularized review, though, the
approach is narrowly circumscribed. Effective supervision over the
choice between single- and multimember districts is achieved, but
the other aspects of reapportionment decrees are unaffected. District
courts remain free to choose where to draw the district lines, a
remedial decision of at least as great importance as the choice between
single- and multimember districts. Though some relatively simple
remedial problems might be amenable to the use of presumptive
preferences as to all aspects of the decision,98 reapportionment and
numerous other complex remedial problems are not. The drawing
of legislative district lines cannot be sensibly governed by presumptive
preferences, nor can the drawing of school attendance zones, the
correction of unconstitutional prison conditions, or the remedying of
myriad other violations. Just as the inevitable diversity of the situa-
tions to be remedied limits the usefulness of remedial rules establish-
ing right-remedy interlocks, so it also limits the usefulness of presump-
tive preferences. Some effective appellate control is achieved, but
pervasive appellate control can be obtained only by some other
approach.
F. Particularistic Review of the Adequacy of a Remedy
The appellate approaches discussed heretofore share a common
feature: they do not call for comprehensive appellate consideration
of the appropriateness of the chosen remedy in the particular circum-
stances. 97 Yet, as has often been emphasized, sensible equitable
remedies for the most part must be tailored to the facts of individual
cases.9 Some degree of remedial generalization is possible, but there
are large areas where molding decrees to the unique circumstances
will inevitably be required. So long as choosing the proper decree
remains the exclusive province of district courts, significant appellate
,control will not be achieved.
The appellate role has not always been so narrowly confined.
Appellate courts have often undertaken particularistic review of
remedial choices. One approach for doing so involves an inquiry into
Id. at 771-73. The Court also rejected a justification offered by the defendant. Id.
at 773-75.
96. See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946) (presumptively preferred
remedy for use of misleading tradename is to require qualifying language rather than
to eliminate tradename).
97. The presumptive preference approach does require appellate consideration of
the particular circumstances where heightened scrutiny is applied to district court
departures from the presumption. Even there, however, particularistic review is
limited to the remedial scheme generally.
98. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
1976]
430 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.4:411
the adequacy of the chosen remedy, in the particular situation, to
vindicate the right on which the plaintiff's suit is based. This section
analyzes that approach. The other approach is broader, involving an
inquiry into the appropriateness of the remedy not only from the
viewpoint of vindicating the plaintiff's underlying right, but in light
of all of the other implicated interests as well. That approach is
analyzed in the next section.
The adequacy approach is illustrated by many of the school de-
segregation cases. Plaintiffs challenging a district court desegregation
decree have rarely been met by deference to the district court's dis-
cretion as to the choice of remedies. Instead, appellate courts have
framed the issue as whether the chosen remedy is adequate to vindicate
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Appellate consideration of that
question has been plenary.99
The approach is typified by Green v. County School Board.10° The
Supreme Court in that case invalidated the district court's freedom-of-
choice plan for desegregating the schools of New Kent County, Vir-
ginia. The Court carefully avoided any general pronouncement dis-
approving freedom-of-choice plans,10 1 resting its holding instead on a
particularized analysis of the New Kent County situation.0 2 The Court
did not rely on the district court's analysis of the sufficiency of the
plan, and it did not speak of "abuse of discretion."
The Court undertook no explanation of why the issue was
appropriate for de novo appellate consideration. If the contention
had been that the freedom-of-choice plan was itself unconstitutional,
then the question would have been a question of substantive constitu-
tional rights rather than merely a question of the appropriate remedy
for earlier constitutional violations. Such a question of constitutional
rights-a clear "question of law"'0 3 -would have called for plenary
appellate review. The Court, however, refrained from labeling the
plan unconstitutional, choosing instead to invalidate it as "in-
sufficient. ' ' 10 4 The Court emphasized the former statutorily-mandated
pattern of racial segregation and the school board's history of re-
99. See, e.g., Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970);
Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963)
(alternate holding). But see Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974).
100. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
101. Id. at 439-41.
102. Id. at 441.
103. See note 17 supra.
104. 391 U.S. at 441,
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calcitrance toward Brown v. Board of Education.1°5 It announced
remedial principles, stressing that a school board must come forward
with a plan promising "realistically to work now."106 The emphasis on
how to remedy dual school systems rather than on what types of
school systems are or are not constitutional indicates that the issue
was seen as one of appropriate remedies rather than underlying
rights °. 1 0
Nor can the Court's de novo treatment of the issue be explained
by saying that the adequacy of a remedy to vindicate underlying rights
is always a question for the appellate court. Appellate courts have
often counseled deference to district courts on the question of the
adequacy of chosen remedies. 08 Green and various other school
desegregation cases'," mark a departure from traditional review
standards." 0
105. Id. at 437-38.
106. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
107. That is clearly the correct framing of the issue. The unconstitutionality of
the New Kent County school system was established by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown f]. While it is true that at some point the taint of
statutorily mandated segregation can be eradicated, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971), New Kent County clearly had not reached that
point. Given the undoubted constitutional violation, the analysis is not furthered
by inquiring whether the district court's plan was or was not constitutional. Remedies
often go beyond the minimum which would have been constitutional if originally
undertaken by the school authorities. For example, no one would contend that a
state which had not otherwise discriminated would be required to bus students across
town in order to avoid being held in violation of the Constitution, yet remedies for
preexisting violations often include such a requirement. Conversely, remedies need
not immediately go as far as would be required to avoid an original constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) [Brown I].
Analysis is sharpened by distinguishing two separate issues: whether there has been
a violation, and if so how to remedy it.
108. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) [Lemon II] (upholding as
within district court's broad remedial discretion its refusal to enjoin state's reimburse-
ment of sectarian schools for expenditures made in reliance on unconstitutional state
statute). Cf. United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (strong showing of abuse
must be made to reverse district court's broad discretion in withholding injunction
where defendant had voluntarily discontinued antitrust violation); Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (upholding discretionary refusal to issue injunction
for conceded Williams Act violation).
109. See, e.g., cases cited note 99 supra.
110. The reason for heightened review does not seem to have been the danger
of district court resistance to the Supreme Court's school desegregation mandates.
That danger is presumably no greater than the danger of resistance to the Supreme
Court's establishment clause mandates, yet in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)
[Lemon II], the Court rejected a claim that the district court's establishment clause
remedy was inadequate, citing the district court's broad discretion. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has undertaken de novo review of the adequacy of chosen remedies
in several antitrust cases where the danger of district court resistance to Supreme
Court mandates seems no greater than in other areas. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's,
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To conclude that the reasons for using the approach have not
been explained is not to condemn it. An appellate approach which
ensures remedial adequacy is to be applauded. The question, of
course, is not whether to utilize adequate remedies but what court
can best determine when a remedy is adequate. Even assuming,
though, that the district court is better able to make that assessment,
appellate review of the adequacy of the chosen remedy can in no
way lead to the implementation of inadequate remedies. Such review
is one-way review: district courts are required to adopt more stringent
remedies when their choices are deemed insufficient, but they are
not required to cut back on their chosen remedies when appellate
courts conclude that less stringent remedies would have sufficed.
Therefore, the approach can only increase the frequency with which
remedies are in fact adequate.11 The approach assures a useful and
meaningful appellate role.
Nevertheless, the district courts are left wide discretion. There are
usually numerous adequate remedies for vindicating a given right, and
appellate review of remedial adequacy provides no supervision of
the choice among them.112 The appellate role is limited and falls
short of providing effective and pervasive remedial control. Choosing
remedies remains largely the province of district courts.
It is arguable that it is enough for appellate courts to ensure that
rights are adequately protected and that remedial choices are other-
wise properly left to the district courts. The issue of how much control
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52 (1962); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173,
185-86 (1944).
111. The relative adequacy of various remedial alternatives cannot be precisely
determined, of course, and it is possible that an appellate court might erroneously opt
for a "more stringent" remedy which in fact turns out to be less adequate. However, when
plaintiffs successfully urge disapproval of a remedy, the likelihood that their proposed
substitute, or any other remedy subsequently adopted, will be less adequate to vindicate
their rights is surely small.
112. "Adequate" could never be defined so stringently as to eliminate the remaining
district court discretion by requiring use of "the very most effective remedy for
vindicating the underlying rights." As the school cases indicate, such an approach
would be wholly unacceptable. For example, the school desegregation remedy which
would be "the very most effective to vindicate the underlying rights" might include
ordering the construction of a complete set of school buildings at more desirable loca-
tions, drastic measures to alter the area's housing patterns, and replacement of all
school administrators. Even if such high levels of "adequacy" were established, there
would be wide bounds within which choices would have to be made. Someone would
have to choose where to locate the new school buildings. Someone would have to
choose exactly how to alter drastically the area's housing patterns. Someone would
have to choose replacements for the school officials. If the appellate role is confined
to reviewing the adequacy of a remedy, those choices are left within broad limits to
the district court. When the definition of "adequacy" is reduced to a reasonable
standard, the area of choice left to the district court becomes far greater.
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appellate courts should exercise will be addressed later. 113 It should
be noted, however, that appellate courts do not ensure that all rights
are adequately protected merely by reviewing the adequacy of a
remedy to vindicate the rights which underlie the plaintiffs' claims.
Other rights besides those of the plaintiffs are almost always involved.
In a school desegregation case, for example, the remedy usually
determines which schools students attend and affects the character of
those schools. In doing so the remedial choice affects important
interests of students and parents, interests not involved in the liability
phase of the lawsuit."4 These interests have constitutional overtones,
as indicated by such decisions as Meyer v. Nebraska-1 and Wisconsin
v. Yoder."6 In addition, important interests of the state are involved;
the public fisc may be greatly affected," 7 and remedial decrees are
also likely to implicate principles of federalism which the Court has
often heralded."" A school desegregation remedy which is adequate
to vindicate the plaintiffs' right to nondiscriminatory treatment may
not be the most feasible accommodation of these other interests.
Accordingly, appellate review of the adequacy of the remedy chosen
to vindicate the plaintiffs' underlying rights does not automatically
safeguard the other interests at stake.
Indeed, if appellate courts limit themselves to reviewing the
adequacy of a remedy to vindicate the plaintiffs' underlying rights,
the result may be to discourage district courts from taking very
seriously the accommodation of other interests. One-way review en-
courages district courts to adopt broad remedies. Dissatisfied plaintiffs
can obtain de novo appellate consideration of the adequacy of their
remedy, as the plaintiffs did in Green. Reversal is thus a substantial
possibility. Dissatisfied defendants, on the other hand, can obtain
appellate review only under the deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education"9 the Supreme Court, after deciding that the remedial
113. See notes 158-87 and accompanying text infra.
114. Members of plaintiff classes also have interests, other than those involved in
the liability phase of the suit, which are affected by remedial choices.
115. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
116. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
117. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (court may
order school officials to levy taxes to finance reopening of schools); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (approving expensive remedy). Cf. San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1973) (emphasizing
importance of state control over school financing).
118. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, 49
(1973). Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-81 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
119. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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measures adopted by the district court were within the broad and
flexible equitable remedial powers of the federal courts, rather un-
critically concluded that their use in that particular case did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. 12 0 In combination, Green and Swann
indicate that district court judges can insulate themselves from reversal
by giving little attention to interests other than the rights plaintiffs
seek to vindicate in the lawsuit. Because of this, the substance of
remedial choices may well be affected in an undesirable manner.
In sum, the approach provides a useful and meaningful appellate
role, but fails to establish any control over a wide range of district
court discretion and builds a substantive bias into the system which
may result in undesirable remedial choices.
G. Particularistic Review of the Appropriateness of a Remedy
The final approach which appellate courts have used for controlling
public law remedies is the most extensive. It involves the full,
particularistic redetermination of the appropriateness of the chosen
remedy. The appellate court scrutinizes the chosen remedy not only
to determine its adequacy to vindicate the right on which plaintiff's
suit is based, but also to determine whether the remedy reaches the
most desirable accommodation of all the interests involved. The
appellate court determines for itself whether the chosen remedy is
the one which should be utilized.121
A notable example is Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States. 22
The defendants there were held to have violated the antitrust laws by
suppressing competition in the glass machinery and manufactured
glassware industries. The district court entered a complex 46-page
decree,"1 3 retaining a receiver who had been appointed pendente lite
to administer Hartford's affairs and imposing various conditions on
120. It may have been evident that the district court's chosen remedy accommodated
the various interests as well as could be done by an effective desegregation order.
However, nothing in the Court's opinion indicates that easy affirmance will be
accorded only those district court orders which it is evident will strike a desirable
accommodation of the various interests. Rather, Swann seems to indicate that district
court orders will be uncritically upheld against defendants' assertions that the remedies
are unnecessarily broad, except in the rare case where the remedy violates a rule
eliminating a category of alternatives. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
121. The district court's remedy is of course not totally disregarded. Where the
choice between the district court's remedy and some alternative is a matter of in-
difference to the appellate court, the district court's remedy will be upheld. Beyond
that, the district court's choice may have virtually no effect or may be controlling only
on details.
122. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
123. Id. at 392. In addition to the 46-page decree the district court entered a
160-page opinion, and the record in the Supreme Court spanned 16,500 pages.
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defendants' businesses. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed,
paragraph-by-paragraph review of the decree. 114 It concluded that the
receivership was "not necessary to the prescription of appropriate
relief" and accordingly declared that it should be terminated. 25 The
Court did not purport to take the district court's views into account
at all. Similarly, the Court meticulously analyzed the other specific
provisions of the decree and made numerous detailed changes. 126 It
altered both significant provisions and provisions of comparative
triviality, making each of its changes on the basis of its own original
judgment without relying on the district court to any degree. 7
The Supreme Court did not explain why it undertook such a
careful, particularized review.1 28 The reason does not seem to have
been disapproval of the district court's excessive harshness to the
defendants, for although the vast majority of the Supreme Court's
changes favored the defendants, one significant change went further
in granting the government relief than the district court had gone.1 29
Moreover, although Hartford-Empire is notable for the depth of the
Supreme Court's inquiry into an extremely complex remedial scheme,
it is by no means the Court's only searching, non-deferential review
of an antitrust decree. Such review has been undertaken both where
the district court's decree went too far"30 and where it did not go far
enough."'
124. Id. at 410-35.
125. Id. at 411.
126. Id. at 410-35.
127. The dissent challenged not only the wisdom of the majority's changes as
a substantive matter but also the propriety of the scope of review utilized. Justice
Rutledge lamented that it was not the Supreme Court's business to rewrite the decree.
Id. at 441 (dissenting opinion).
128. On a subsequent motion for clarification or reconsideration, the Court rejected
the contention that it had no authority to modify the district court's decree. The
Court invoked "the unquestioned power of an appellate court in an equity cause"
and said further that "in suits under the Sherman Act, it is unthinkable that Congress
has entrusted the enforcement of a statute of such far-reaching importance to the
judgment of a single judge, without review of the relief granted or denied by him."
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570, 571 (1945). The Court did not
discuss why, given the power to modify the decree, the standard of review was so high.
129. The district court had imposed restrictions on a trade association which the
defendants had used in effecting their illegal practices. The Supreme Court concluded
that it would be better to order the association's dissolution, noting that the district
court's order had already destroyed much of its usefulness and that detecting improper
uses of the association would be difficult. 323 U.S. at 428.
130. See Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
131. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Cf. United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
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The Court has adverted to the need for greater scrutiny in
expediting Act 3 2 appeals because of the absence of intervening
court of appeals consideration of the cases.1"' But that alone does not
explain the Court's heightened review, for the traditional abuse-of-
discretion standard has never been thought to apply only to the
second appellate level. Courts of appeals have generally relied on
district court determinations in the same manner the Supreme Court
has;13 1 to say that the Supreme Court's position in expediting
Act appeals is analogous to that of a court of appeals does not explain
its departure from deferential review standard. Moreover, the Supreme
Court also hears direct appeals in other areas, 135 and it has not
attempted to distinguish standards of review based on whether or not
there has been intervening consideration by a court of appeals.3 6
The Court has also adverted to the public interest in antitrust
decrees as warranting careful appellate scrutiny.' 37 The public interest
in other public law cases is often at least as great, and in many such
cases appellate review has been cursory. 3 8 Perfunctory review has
even been exhibited in antitrust cases, usually without any mention
of the line of cases applying a higher standard. 1 9 In the rare instances
where the Court has acknowledged the inconsistency of its approaches,
it has not undertaken any explanation but has merely announced
which approach it deems appropriate in the case at bar.4-
Whatever the reasons for the Court's heightened scrutiny, the
approach is no longer reserved solely for antitrust decrees. For example,
the Court has indicated its willingness to review reapportionment
decrees with much greater care than an abuse-of-discretion approach
would call for. The Court's earliest decisions reviewing reapportion-
ment decrees involved claims that the decreed apportionment
schemes were themselves unconstitutional. In deciding such questions
132. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
133. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 322-25 (1961).
134. See, e.g., Montano v. Lee, 401 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968); J.M. Fields of Anderson,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 330 F.2d 686, 687 (5th Cir. 1964); Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
143 F.2d 38, 43 (7th Cir. 1944).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
136. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) [Lemon II] (deferring
on direct appeal to district court's broad discretion).
137. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 322-25 (1961);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1944).
138. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
139. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436 (1940).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185-86
(1944).
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of substantive constitutional rights-in contrast to questions of which
of various constitutionally acceptable remedies to implement-the Court
of course made its own analysis. Thus, when appellants in Swann v.
Adams41 questioned the constitutionality of the district court's re-
apportionment plan, the Supreme Court decided on its own that the
plan was unconstitutional. No deference was accorded the district court.
More recent apportionment appeals have challenged the appropri-
ateness, rather than the constitutionality, of the district courts' choices.
However, the Court's willingness to use a non-deferential review
standard has continued. In Whitcomb v. Chavis'142 the district court
held the use of a multimember legislative district for Marion County,
Indiana, to be an unconstitutional deprivation of the voting rights
of the district's ghetto residents. It also held the entire state to be
unconstitutionally apportioned. It entered a reapportionment decree
eliminating every multimember district in the state and correcting
the impermissible population disparities.1 14 The Supreme Court sus-
tained the district court's holding that Indiana's statewide apportion-
ment was unconstitutional but rejected the holding that the Marion
County multimember district was itself unconstitutional.144 The Court
went on to say that even if the district court had been correct in
concluding that the use of a multimember district for Marion County
unconstitutionally infringed the voting rights of ghetto residents, its
broad decree could not be sustained.'?4 The Court suggested several
alternatives which the district court could have adopted, such as using
single-member districts for the ghetto area while leaving the
remainder of Marion County as a multimember district, or leaving
the entire district intact while requiring a certain number of the
district's representatives to be residents of the ghetto. 48 The Court
did not explain why the evaluation of such options was not a matter
for the district court's discretion. In addition, the Court hinted
at its willingness to review district court reapportionment plans to
an even greater extent, saying its failure to pass on the details in the
case at hand resulted from the need for revision of the plan in light
of the intervening 1970 census.'4 7
The courts of appeal have also sometimes refused to rely on
district court resolutions of remedial issues. In Rhem v. Malcolm,148
141. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
142. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
143. Id. at 139.
144. Id. at 160, 161.
145. Id. at 160-61.
146. Id. at 160.
147. Id. at 141. See also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
148. 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
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the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decree directed at
remedying unconstitutional conditions in the Manhattan House
of Detention for Men (the "Tombs"). In January 1974, the
district court had held the jail conditions unconstitutional, and
in March 1974 it had ordered the city to submit a remedial plan.
The city failed to do so, and in July the court ordered the Tombs
closed within a month, saying its order would be reconsidered
if the city submitted a plan.149 The court of appeals said the district
court's order clearly would not have been an abuse of discretion if
entered in January, and it noted that the city had really known since
January that it would be required to formulate a plan." 0 Nonetheless,
the court of appeals did not simply uphold the district court's order but
proceeded to prescribe a more appropriate approach. The court said
that rather than ordering the Tombs closed unless the city submitted
a plan, "the order should be framed to close the prison to detainees
or to limit its use for detainees to certain narrow functions by a fixed
date, unless specified standards are met."1'51 The court listed several
examples of the types of provisions it deemed acceptable and remanded
the case to the district court with instructions that the parties be given
further opportunity to offer suggestions. 152 Though many of the
specifics were left to the district court, it was clear that the court of
appeals had undertaken a de novo review of the appropriateness of
the original order.
The examples of heightened review discussed above disposed of
cases in different ways. In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,"'
the Supreme Court disapproved some of the district court's pro-
visions and prescribed the provisions to be used as substitutes.- In
Whitcomb v. Chavis"' and Rhem v. Malcolm,"6 on the other hand,
the appellate courts, rather than prescribing specific substitutes,
broadly outlined several alternatives from which the district courts
could choose. The Hartford-Empire approach results in the imple-
mentation on remand of the remedy the appellate court deems
appropriate. The Whitcomb and Rhem approach calls the district
court's discretion back into play on remand, but the appellate court
149. Id. at 339.
150. Id. at 340.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 341.
153. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
154. Even in prescribing specific provisions the Court's approach was incremental,
i.e., it built on the district court's foundation rather than starting anew.
155. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
156. 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
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maintains effective control so long as it will again make its own
assessment of the appropriateness of the newly chosen remedy. 15 The
Hartford-Empire approach is more direct, but both approaches yield
effective control over remedial choices.
IV. THE DESIRABILITY OF EXTENSIVE APPELLATE REVIEW
A. The Traditional Allocation of Rules
Between District and Appellate Courts
The question that I have deferred until now is whether extensive
appellate control of remedies is desirable. It is useful to begin an
analysis of that issue with a review of the traditional division of
responsibility between federal district and appellate courts.
Ultimate responsibility for deciding "questions of law" is assigned
to appellate courts, and primary responsibility for deciding "questions
of fact" is assigned to district courts. Despite its obvious fuzziness the
law-fact distinction is for the most part a serviceable guide. 15 8 Two
notions may underlie this allocation of functions. First, it may be
based on institutional competences: district courts observe the
witnesses and may, therefore, be able to resolve factual disputes more
reliably than appellate courts. Second, the allocation may be based
on the relative importance of the disputed issues: decisions on ques-
tions of law become part of a body of precedent and thus often have
widespread, enduring ramifications extending beyond the adjudicated
controversy; decisions on questions of fact purportedly affect only the
parties to the particular litigation. The greater importance of decisions
on questions of law is presumably thought to necessitate assigning
ultimate responsibility for them to appellate courts.
Neither of these factors, the importance of the disputed issues nor
institutional competences, supports assigning ultimate responsibility
for choosing public law remedies to district courts. By definition public
law remedies affect the public. 5 9 It is clear that the result in any
particular case impacts upon many persons other than the parties
to the lawsuit. Public law remedies often affect whole communities.
157. The extent of the control depends on the extent to which on a subsequent
appeal the appellate court would be willing to make its own assessment of the
remedies. The Whitcomb and Rhem cases undertook de novo consideration of the
appropriateness in the particular circumstances of the district courts' general remedial
approaches; if the district courts adopted the suggested general approaches on remand,
it is unclear whether the appellate courts would have reverted to the abuse-of-discretion
review standard. If they did, the level of appellate control would be significantly less
than in Hartford-Empire.
158. See note 17 supra.
159. See note 9 supra.
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Moreover, public law remedies may become part of a body of precedent
and, like other decisions on questions of law, influence the results in
future cases. 160 Public law remedial decisions are thus at least as
important as the routine decisions on questions of law which are
submitted to appellate courts every day. Just as the importance of
questions of law warrants plenary appellate review, the often greater
importance of public law remedial decisions also warrants plenary
review. 16 1
Turning to relative competences, the only clear institutional ad-
vantage of district courts is their ability to observe the witnesses. No
matter how valuable demeanor evidence may be in assessing factual
disputes, though, it is of very little significance in choosing remedies.
At the remedy stage the facts are far less controversial than the
inferences to be derived from the facts and the significance to be
accorded them. The cold record is likely to be as helpful as observing
the hearings. Indeed, when district courts proceed on the basis of
documentary evidence and masters' reports, they have no greater
access to demeanor evidence than appellate courts. In short, the
availability of demeanor evidence should not affect the allocation
between district and appellate courts of the responsibility for choosing
remedies.
There is another aspect of institutional competences which might
be thought to warrant deference to district court remedial choices.
The district court is likely to achieve much greater familiarity with
the whole case, especially in complex and protracted litigation. The
appellate court sees only the tip of an iceberg. Thus the problem is
posed: complex cases are often the most important and affect the
most people, thereby calling for greater appellate control; but at the
same time complex cases may be the ones that appellate courts are
least capable of assessing reliably.
160. Fashioning remedies will of course never become merely an exercise in applying
precedent. The need to mold decrees to particular circumstances limits the role of
precedent to guiding, not determining, remedial decisions. But the guidance can be
significant. See, e.g., Kilgarin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 (1967) (summarily upholding
aspect of remedy on basis of precedent); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 386, 429 (1945) (rejecting antitrust decree provision on basis of precedent); Bowman
v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1967) (remanding for entry of
faculty desegregation order at least as extensive as particular decree issued by another
court).
161. It has even been suggested that the importance of public law cases warrants
appellate redetermination of the facts. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAav.
L. Rav. 994, 1070 (1965). The arguments for remedial review are stronger than those
for factual review in two fundamental respects. First, unlike findings of fact, remedial
decisions contribute to a body of precedent and affect future cases; they are thus
more important. Second, the district court observes the witnesses, making its findings
of fact more reliable than an appellate court's.
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The depth of the dilemma should not be overstated. Even if
appellate court assessments are indeed less reliable, it does not follow
that total deference should be accorded the district courts. It would
be enough for appellate courts to proceed cautiously, maintaining
an awareness of their limitations and giving due regard to the
conclusions of the district courts. An appellate court could still inter-
ject its own judgment: (1) where seeing the "whole picture" seems
less important; (2) where the district court's decision appears in-
appropriate whatever the "whole picture" might reveal; and most im-
portantly, (3) where broad policies seem to call for a basically different
approach than that taken by the district court. Hence, even accepting a
harsh view of appellate competences, greater review is called for than
the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard provides.
Moreover, there is no reason to accept the harsh view of appellate
competences. It is no doubt true that district courts will inevitably
have greater familiarity with complex cases than appellate courts can
hope to acquire, but there is no reason to suppose that complete
familiarity with every facet of a case is necessary or even helpful to a
complete assessment of remedies. Appellate courts do not act in a
vacuum. They begin with the district court's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, 162 and are often provided with the district court's
explanation of its decree. With that background the briefs and argu-
ments can highlight the significant factors from which the appellate
court should work. 6 3 At its best that system should permit the
appellate court to develop a firm grasp of the case. The appellate
court will perhaps never be able to deal intelligently with all the
details of a complex decree, but it will not be called upon to do so.16
Only the more significant aspects of the decree are the ones as to
which appellate review is important, and the parties will almost always
emphasize those aspects and insure appellate court familiarity with
them. 6 5 Acquiring the requisite knowledge of a case will of course
require a significant commitment of time and effort by the appellate
court; it is not impossible, however.
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
163. The system will work best if participation is not limited to parties. Rather,
all significantly affected interests should be represented.
164. The Supreme Court has on occasion dealt with the details of a complex
decree. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). However,
extensive and meaningful appellate review can normally be achieved by focusing on
the basic structure and significant aspects of a decree.
165. Which aspects of a decree are "significant" may not be self-evident, but
this does not create a problem. So long as all appreciably affected interests are represented
in the appellate process, see note 163 supra, the court need not itself determine the
"significant" aspects of the decree. Instead, the court can simply rely on the parties
-and amici..
1976)
442 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:411
It should be noted that the factor of institutional competences
does not cut only one way. First, the district court's greater familiarity
with the case may be a disadvantage as well as an advantage. The
court's tremendously intense, sometimes almost personal, involvement
may lead to a mind-set which makes objective and sensitive considera-
tion of new evidence and alternatives virtually impossible. The
district court may lose its sense of perspective. Moreover, the appellate
court has institutional competences the district court may lack. It
adjudicates public law cases in not just one area but in many, develop-
ing thereby a broader outlook. The appellate court thus achieves a
better command of overall policy objectives and how they relate to
remedies. These institutional competences favor extensive appellate
review of remedies, and they go far to offset the institutional advantage
provided by the district courts' greater knowledge of particular cases.
In sum, there is no reason to suppose that appellate courts are not
fully competent extensively to review remedial choices. Appellate re-
view will bring to bear competences that district courts lack. The
greater familiarity with complex cases which district courts are
likely to achieve may sometimes lead appellate courts to exercise
caution and to keep in mind their relative disadvantage, but it cer-
tainly does not justify abandoning extensive review. In view of the
great importance of public law remedial choices, the factors underlying
the traditional allocation of roles point toward allocating ultimate
responsibility for those choices to the appellate courts.
B. The Effect on Appellate Resources
There remains, however, another issue. Although it is arguable
that any shortage of judicial resources should not be allowed to fore-
close access to a judicial forum, 168 a more practical analysis requires
the consideration of whether our limited appellate resources can
sustain the required commitment.
It is unlikely that increasing the level of appellate scrutiny will
significantly increase the percentage of cases which are appealed. Most
public law cases are appealed anyway, usually on the liability issue
and often on the remedy issue as well.1' The prospect of heightened
166. A less rigid argument is that the scarcity of judicial resources should not
foreclose extensive appellate remedial review unless such review would be a less
valuable use of resources than the uses to which appellate resources are currently
devoted. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410-11 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
167. The reason remedies are often appealed is that, as previously indicated, some
renderings of remedial issues are always seen as subject to plenary appellate review.
See generally notes 23-46 and accompanying text supra. If either party claims that some
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appellate scrutiny might lead parties to appeal from more orders in
the same case and thus increase the number of appeals' 6 8 but the
separate appeals could easily be consolidated in most instances. 169
Therefore, any incremental burden imposed on appellate courts will
result not from additional appeals but only from expansion of the
issues involved in existing appeals.
Several of the approaches which have been used for supervising
remedial choices require little if any additional resources. This is
especially true of the procedural approach which requires district
courts to indicate that they have exercised their discretion in line
with existing guidelines and have adequately considered the available
alternatives.170 Once a case is before an appellate court on the issue
of liability so that the judges are generally familiar with it, little of
their time is required to review the district court's opinion for com-
pliance with these guidelines. Similarly, announcing rules171 or pre-
'remedial rule should govern the case, the appellate court will reach a de novo
determination of the issue. That such claims are not often successful does not prevent
them from being made. Moreover, even when appellate review is filtered through the
abuse-of-discretion standard there is some slight chance that the district court decision
will be set aside. Such a slight chance of success would not warrant taking an appeal
in a typical private lawsuit, but the tremendous importance of many public law
cases makes it worthwhile to take an appeal if there is any chance at all of success.
Indeed, the moral and philosophical overtones of some public law cases might induce
parties to fight on even where the chance of success is negligible. That phenomenon, in
combination with the high level of uncertainty as to the governing law, leads to the
almost automatic appeal of public law cases on the issues relating to liability.
168. Each separate order comprising the overall "remedy" is an appealable order,
either as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), or as an order "granting, con-
tinuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving" an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(1970).
169. Indeed, some reexamination of the rules regarding appealability might be
appropriate. Though each separate order comprising the overall remedy is currently
an appealable order, see note 168 supra, it might be preferable to create some
mechanism for treating such orders collectively. Such a system would be consistent
with the rationale of the final order rule, i.e., avoiding piecemeal review. However,
as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) recognizes, there is an interest in securing immediate
review of orders which might have irreparable or at least highly obtrusive consequences.
Some compromise of the conflicting policies is in order.
In the meantime, the ability to consolidate appeals should prove a serviceable
tool. Counsel would be required to file a notice of appeal each time an objectionable
order is entered, but the separate appeals need not consume more appellate resources
than would a single appeal from a combined order. In addition, any calendaring
problems could be handled by existing devices; stays and expedited appeals would
continue to be available as needed.
170. See generally notes 69-82 and accompanying text supra.
171. It is well established that any remedial rules will be subject to plenary
appellate review. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra. As to rules, the issue
is not which level of courts will announce them; rather the issue is whether controlling
remedies through rules is a rational and effective approach. In most circumstances it
is not.
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sumptive preferences does not require greater appellate court
knowledge of cases than those courts possess already. 172 The burden on
appellate resources should not affect the decision whether or not to
utilize these approaches.
In many public law areas extensive control can only be achieved
by particularistic review. 173 Such review generally requires the appellate
court to become better acquainted with the decree and the underlying
factual situation than is necessary for disposing of the issue of liability.
Thus there is a drain on appellate resources, but it could be minimized
by the appellate court's building incrementally from the district
court's decree rather than formulating a new remedy from the ground
up.
This procedure minimizing the appellate burden is illustrated by
two particularistic review cases discussed earlier. In Whitcomb v.
Chavis,'17 the Supreme Court disapproved the district court's re-
apportionment decree using exclusively single-member districts. The
Court did not mold a substitute decree-a step which would have re-
quired a considerable increase in the time the Court devoted to the
case-but instead mentioned several approaches the district court
should consider on remand.17 5 Similarly, in Rhem v. Malcolm ,'7
when the Second Circuit disapproved the district court's decree it
remanded the case for consideration of various suggested alternatives.' 77
Particularistic review will be even more effective and less burden-
some if district courts are required to explain their remedial choices.'78
Such explanations focus the inquiry, allowing the appellate court to
start from the district court's analysis. Points on which the persuasive-
ness of the district court's opinion cannot be shaken can be disposed
of rather summarily. Wasted appellate scrutiny can therefore be
eliminated.
It might be objected that such an incremental approach will con-
sume rather than save appellate resources because it may require
repeated appeals in the same case. The district court's decree on
remand may result in a second appeal; if the appellate court again
172. The effectiveness of the presumptive preference approach turns on the scope
of review of district court decisions that the presumption is overcome. See notes 91-95
and accompanying text supra. If the scope of review is high, the appellate court
may have to become more familiar with a case than would otherwise be required.
173. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text supra.
174. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
175. Id. at 160.
176. 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
177. Id. at 341.
178. As previously indicated, such a requirement should be imposed whether or
not particularistic review is undertaken. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
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disapproves the decree there will be another remand and later perhaps
yet another appeal. At least theoretically the process could continue
forever. In practice, however, the problem is unlikely to be very
significant. An appellate court sensitive to the district court's problems
will be able to provide sufficient guidance to minimize the risk of
repeated reversals.
Indeed, rather than leading to repeated appeals a system of
particularized review might eventually result in fewer appeals. Candid
remedial discussion will develop a body of experience upon which
district courts can draw in formulating remedies and appellate courts
can draw in reviewing them. The precedential value of the decisions 79
may make it clear in some instances that an appeal would be unfruit-
ful.180 At any rate the body of experience will make it easier to dispose
of appeals. In addition, the initial burden which the formulation of
remedies imposes upon district courts will be reduced.
The conclusion seems justified that widespread particularistic
review could be undertaken without causing any devastating increase
in the appellate workload.,8 ' Of course, it could be argued that we
should disapprove even the undramatic drain on appellate resources
which would be occasioned. Our courts are already overburdened,
the argument would run, and in the name of conserving judicial
resources we have often opted for the certainty of clear rules rather
than balancing the equities of each case in search of a few better
results. However, the inaptness of the analogy should be emphasized.
If we decide to eschew particularistic remedial review it will not be
in favor of a rule deemed to reach the desirable result in most cases.
Rather, it will be in favor of ad hoc district court decisions. Certainty
will not be provided, and the number of lawsuits being litigated will
not be reduced. Therefore, the resulting tolerance of at least some
undesirable outcomes cannot be justified by the societal advantages
usually associated with choosing the certainty of rules over the some-
times greater reliability of individualized determinations. The argu-
ment for disapproving particularistic review must rest squarely on the
notion that additional review is not worth the resources consumed.
Striking that balance requires an analysis of the importance of appellate
review.
179. See note 160 supra and cases cited therein.
180. Usually, however, the importance of a public law decree and the moral or
philosophical overtones of the contested issues will produce an appeal even where the
result is only slightly in doubt. See note 167 supra. Nevertheless, the pressure to appeal
will be greatly reduced after one round, and well-articulated appellate decisions will
minimize the incidence of multiple appeals.
181. Indeed, as previously indicated, particularistic review has already been under-
taken in various cases. See generally notes 121-57 and accompanying text supra.
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C. The Importance of Appellate Review
I have already emphasized the enormous importance of public
law remedial decisions. Although full appellate review is traditionally
accorded decisions of such widespread importance, it is perhaps not
self-evident that that should necessarily be so. It is submitted that a
meaningful appellate role-announcing rules or guideposts of pre-
sumptive preferences where those techniques are useful, scrutinizing
district court explanations of their decisions, and frequently under-
taking some level of particularistic review-should be developed. Two
sets of concerns underlie this submission. First, public law remedies
rank among the most controversial decisions rendered by modern
courts. Appellate review can enhance the authoritativeness of the
decisions and help make the judicial role effective in practice as well
as in theory. Second, it requires no elaboration that decisions of such
importance should be as reliable as possible, and appellate review
can help maximize their reliability.18 2
The first reaction of a lay person to an adverse judicial ruling is
often a vow to fight the decision "all the way to the Supreme Court."
The lay person may know little of the relevant substantive law and
virtually nothing of judicial procedure, but he knows he can appeal
and he knows the final word is that of the Supreme Court. While it
is true that an appellate court's wholly deferential affirmance of the
district court's exercise of discretion might, nonetheless, be seen by
the laity as an authoritative appellate pronouncement, it would be
disingenuous to suggest that we should settle for such fraudulent
authoritativeness in regard to decisions of such importance. Authori-
tativeness is enhanced by appellate review, and the review should be
meaningful review. 83
182. "Reliable" here means "correct," i.e., substantively the best remedy which
could be implemented in the lawsuit. It is obviously impossible to state unequivocally
which one remedy is the best in most public law cases. To the extent a best remedy
can be determined, however, the judicial system should be structured so as to assure
that it is the one implemented.
183. Another reason appellate review enhances authoritativeness is that it increases
the number of judges who have approved the remedy. The three-judge court require-
ment, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) repealed, Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, was
enacted out of a concern that one federal judge should not have the power single-
handedly to invalidate an entire state statute. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 967-68 (2d ed. 1973). Even before the institution of three-judge courts, though,
the actions of the single judge were eventually subjected to plenary appellate review.
On the other hand, the effect of public law remedies on the state may be every bit
as devastating as the invalidation of a statute. Nevertheless, not only can a single judge
usually implement such a remedy, but his decision is often insulated from meaningful
appellate review. The heavy criticism which has been leveled at the three-judge court
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
More importantly, appellate review increases the reliability8 4 of
remedial decisions. As previously indicated, appellate courts possess
some institutional advantages over district courts which increase the
reliability of their decisions. First, an appellate court has a fresh
perspective and thus can correct any tendency of the district court
to develop tunnel vision from long exposure to the case. Second,
an appellate court may have a broader perspective and a better
command of general policy goals. A system of extensive appellate
review which builds incrementally from the district court's foundation
utilizes the institutional advantages of both courts and accordingly
secures more reliable results.
Greater reliability would result from extensive appellate review
even if appellate courts had no institutional advantages to inject into
the process. A system of appellate review would produce a body of
remedial experience and precedent. Remedies would still be molded
to particular circumstances, but the reasoned explanations of earlier
results and the greater uniformity in general approaches resulting
from appellate review would significantly decrease the ad hoc nature
of the process.185 Here as elsewhere, ad hoc decisions are much more
suspect than decisions which comport with a general body of law.8 6
One of the most cherished maxims of our system of government
is that it is a government of laws, not of men.8 7 The maxim is less
than completely accurate, of course, but it embodies an important
truth. Decisions which must be reconciled with a structure of
act may indicate the undesirability of requiring three judges for formulating public law
remedies, but the underlying reluctance to entrust so much authority to a single judge
strongly counsels providing meaningful appellate review.
184. See note 182 supra.
185. Theoretically at least, district court remedial decisions could develop into a
body of precedent just as appellate decisions do. But district court remedial decisions,
if not subjected to appellate review, often will not contain the elaboration of reasoning
and the description of the underlying situation necessary to enable them to be
used most effectively by subsequent courts. Moreover, district court decisions do not
bind other district courts, and without appellate review there is no method for
resolving conflicts. Meaningful appellate review is essential to the effective development
of a body of precedent.
186. "Our scheme of ordered liberty is based, like the common law, on enlightened
and uniformly applied legal principle, not on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong in
a particular case." J. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function
in Balance, in THE EvOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 289, 291-92 (D. Shapiro ed.
1969). See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248-87 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (" [There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.").
187. The expression perhaps first found its way into the United States Reports in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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established norms are more likely to be substantively just than are
essentially ad hoc decisions.
Public law remedial decisions are enormously important, for they
touch the lives of almost everyone and affect some persons more
personally than any other governmental action. A sensible system
of appellate review would help transform remedial decisions from
ad hoc choices into parts of an established legal structure. The role
of individual judges would continue to loom large, but to a far
greater extent than now public law remedial decisionmaking would
be government by laws, not by men.
V. CONCLUSION
The uncritical transfer of remedial review standards from the
private law system into the public law system greatly diminishes
appellate control over remedies. Despite the announced review
standards, however, appellate courts have often used various approaches
for supervising remedies more closely. The cases in which they have
done so demonstrate that an effective appellate role can be maintained.
But the failure to confront the issue has prevented an analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the several appellate techniques. They
vary in effectiveness and in the drain which they impose on appellate
resources.
Because public law remedial decisions are enormously important
and often very controversial, it is crucial that they be authoritative
and substantively reliable. It is essential to their reliability and
authoritativeness that meaningful appellate review be provided. While
a case can be made for consistently undertaking full, particularistic
review, it is at least clear that courts should consciously pick and
choose among the several appellate techniques in order to maximize
the effectiveness of the appellate role.
